Press Release
Dec. 11, 2017
VICTORIA – The British Columbia government will complete construction of the Site C hydroelectric dam, saying that to do otherwise would put British Columbians on the hook for an immediate and unavoidable $4-billion bill – with nothing in return – resulting in rate hikes or reduced funds for schools, hospitals and important infrastructure.
“Megaproject mismanagement by the old government has left B.C. in a terrible situation,” said Premier John Horgan in making today’s announcement. “But we cannot punish British Columbians for those mistakes, and we can’t change the past. We can only make the best decision for the future.
“It’s clear that Site C should never have been started. But to cancel it would add billions to the Province’s debt – putting at risk our ability to deliver housing, child care, schools and hospitals for families across B.C. And that’s a price we’re not willing to pay,” said Premier Horgan.
Had government decided to cancel Site C, it would have taken on the project’s $3.9 billion in debt, made up of $2.1 billion already spent and another $1.8 billion in remediation costs. As public debt, it would become the responsibility of BC Hydro customers or taxpayers.
“We will not ask British Columbians to take on $4 billion in debt with nothing in return for the people of this province and, even worse, with massive cuts to the services they count on.
“The old government recklessly pushed Site C past the point of no return, committing billions of dollars to this project without appropriate planning and oversight. Our job now is to make the best of a bad deal and do everything possible to turn Site C into a positive contributor to our energy future.”
Premier Horgan said that in moving forward with the project, his government will launch a Site C turnaround plan to contain project costs while adding tangible benefits. The plan will include:
In addition to funding for provincewide food security projects and programs, the turnaround plan will:
“We’re taking the steps the previous government showed no interest in: a solid budget, enhanced review and oversight, community benefits, and an eye to the future,” Premier Horgan said.
“We’re putting an end to the years of energy policy that put politics ahead of people – where government forced BC Hydro into costly contracts, hiking rates for homeowners and renters, and delivering dividends to government it simply couldn’t afford.”
Premier Horgan added that his government will also be pursuing an alternative energy strategy to put B.C. more firmly on the path to green, renewable power that helps the province exceed its climate goals.
“I respect and honour the commitment of people who oppose Site C, and share their determination to move B.C. to a clean, renewable energy future and to embrace the principles of reconciliation with Indigenous communities,” said Premier Horgan, who acknowledged that Site C does not have the support of all Treaty 8 First Nations. “We know this decision is not what some First Nations wanted. Their voices were heard and their perspectives were an important part of the deliberations on a very challenging decision.
“As we move forward, I welcome ideas from across our province as we define an energy strategy that protects our environment, delivers on our climate responsibilities, powers future generations, and creates jobs and opportunities for all British Columbians.”
Three backgrounders follow.
Contact:
Jen Holmwood
Deputy Communications Director
Office of the Premier
250 818-4881
BACKGROUNDER 1
Dec. 11, 2017
Site C Quick Facts and Mitigation Elements
Quick Facts:
New Management Direction
Agriculture
Community Benefits
First Nations
Contact:
Suntanu Dalal
Media Relations
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources
250 952-0628
BACKGROUNDER 2
Dec. 11, 2017
From private power to Site C: Bad decisions that shaped B.C.’s electricity policy
Government’s decision to proceed with the completion of Site C was driven, in large part, by a series of bad energy policy decisions made over the past decade and a half that put politics ahead of people. These decisions significantly increased the province’s intermittent electricity energy supply and forced upward pressure on electricity rates.
In 2002, the previous government introduced the Energy Plan that mandated that all new power generation opportunities were reserved for private power producers. Through the extensive use of electricity purchase agreements, the board of BC Hydro made long-term commitments to purchase a large supply of new intermittent power, primarily through run-of-river power projects, at prices considerably higher than produced by BC Hydro’s heritage hydroelectric assets.
The board of BC Hydro committed to more than 135 contracts with an average term of 28 years. And while power generated by BC Hydro’s heritage assets cost $32 per MWh, power from IPPs cost $100 per MWh. Today these contracts represent future financial commitments of over $50 billion.
The Energy Plan also changed the structure of BC Hydro and established a standalone BC Transmission Corporation to allow private power producers to access the transmission system and to sell directly to large consumers.
At the same time that BC Hydro was directed to accommodate this new supply of intermittent power, the previous government also instructed BC Hydro to decommission its Burrard Generating Station in Metro Vancouver to address growing concerns about local air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.
As BC Hydro lost needed electrical capacity to backstop its new intermittent power supply, it was forced to seek new capacity or “firm” power, the type traditionally provided by hydroelectric facilities like Site C.
In 2010, the old government introduced the Clean Energy Act, which exempted a number of BC Hydro projects and power procurement activities from independent review by the BC Utilities Commission including Site C, the Clean Power Call, the Smart Metering Program and the Northwest Transmission Line.
The former government then compounded the financial problems at BC Hydro by directing the corporation to pay dividends to the province from funds BC Hydro had to borrow. The cost of this debt is a direct cost to BC Hydro ratepayers.
Between 2001 and 2017, the old government directed BC Hydro to increase its liabilities held in regulatory accounts from $116 million to $5.597 billion. These costs will have to be recovered from ratepayers in the future.
As a result of these earlier policy decisions, the old government saddled BC Hydro with a new supply of long-term expensive intermittent power, without the electrical capacity to maintain reliable service to its customers.
Faced with challenges of its own making, the old government decided to push ahead with Site C without allowing review by British Columbia’s independent regulator, the BC Utilities Commission.
Contact:
Suntanu Dalal
Media Relations
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources
250 952-0628
BACKGROUNDER 3
Dec. 11, 2017
Site C termination implications for BC Hydro customers and British Columbia taxpayers
The decision to proceed with construction of Site C was primarily driven by a determination that British Columbians should not have to take on $4 billion in debt with nothing in return for the people of this province and, even worse, with massive cuts to the services they count on.
Analysis conducted by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, and external experts on the BC Utilities Commission (BCUC), report concluded that completing Site C will be significantly less costly to British Columbians than cancelling the project.
In its report, the BCUC estimated that BC Hydro would need to spend an additional $1.8 billion for termination and site remediation costs if it were to cancel the project. This is in addition to the $2.1 billion of sunk construction and planning costs that will have been spent by the end of December 2017.
Faced with an immediate and unavoidable $4-billion debt, the Province would have to recover these costs from either BC Hydro customers or taxpayers. As a regulated utility, BC Hydro is obligated to file a plan with the independent BCUC, which would ultimately determine the course of action it deemed most appropriate.
The BCUC did not take a position with respect to the options for debt recovery, however, government conducted extensive analysis of the fiscal and rate implications of likely debt recovery options.
If the BCUC determined that BC Hydro could recover the nearly $4 billion in Site C costs from its customers, the commission would then have to decide what the repayment period should be:
If the BCUC decided that BC Hydro should not recover the $4 billion of Site C debt from its customers, the corporation and the Minister of Finance would face two options that would significantly affect B.C. taxpayers.
If BC Hydro retained the $4 billion debt:
If government itself chose to assume the nearly $4 billion of Site C debt – thus safeguarding BC Hydro:
Contact:
Suntanu Dalal
Media Relations
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources
250 952-0628
IBF5
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